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up as a public consultant on the law of his specialty.8 New York
courts in connection with tax matters have prevented recovery by an
accountant on a contract for rendering an opinion as to the law or
the meaning of a tax statute, 9 and have granted an injunction against
the giving of specific advice and opinions to effect compliance with
tax laws and take advantage of tax savings, 10 as being an unlawful
practice of law. Under the Bercu decision the view taken is that
accountants can be permitted as a practical matter to prepare tax returns and deal with incidental legal questions that may arise in connection therewith. When, however, a taxpayer is confronted with a
tax question so involved and difficult that he must go beyond his
regular accountant and seek outside tax law advice, such advice must
be sought from a qualified lawyer.
This decision indicates the aggressive policy of the legal profession to reclaim as fully as possible the highly lucrative field of tax
practice which has been more or less abandoned to accountants.
However, the concession that accountants may prepare tax returns
and give advice in connection therewith still leaves a wide overlapping
field which must be narrowed before any clear-cut distinction appears
as to the point where the accountants' work ends and the lawyers'
begins.
J. C. G.

REAL PROPERTY - RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AMENDMENT.-In 1911, the owners of forty-seven

FOURTEENTH

parcels of land
in a district including fifty-seven parcels signed an agreement restricting the use and occupation of the property for a period of fifty
years to members of the Caucasian race. Five of the remaining parcels were owned by Negroes. In August, 1945, petitioners Shelley,
who are Negroes, purchased the parcel in question having no actual
knowledge of the restrictive agreement which had, however, been
recorded. In 1945, respondents, as owners of other property, brought
an action for an injunction to restrain Shelley from taking possession of the property and requested that a judgment be entered revesting title in the immediate grantor. The trial court denied relief
on the ground that the restrictive covenant had never become effective
since it was not signed by all the owners in the district as was intended when the agreement was drawn up. The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed this decision holding that the agreement was effective and that enforcement of its provisions did not constitute a vio8 Matter of N. Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n (Bercu), 273 App. Div. 524, 78
N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1948).
9 Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp.
462 0(City Ct. 1936).
1 Matter of N. Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n (S. T. & M. Corp.), 181 Misc.
632, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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lation of the rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Held,
judgment reversed. Enforcement by state courts of private covenants
restricting use or occupancy of property to members of the Caucasian
race constitutes state action and is a violation of the "equal protection
clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer,
U. S.-,92 L. ed. 845 (1948).'
The decision in this case is one of the most important handed
down in recent years dealing with rights of minority groups under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 1926, when dictum in the case
of Corrigan v. Buckley 2 indicated that judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants was not unconstitutional, the courts have
almost uniformly held them valid. 3 In that case the issue squarely
decided was that such covenants are valid since the constitutional
prohibitions against discrimination are aimed at governmental, not
private, action. The contention of the defendants that court enforcement of such agreements deprived them of their liberty and property
without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was not properly raised by the pleadings and
the court declined to pass on the constitutional question, 4 but indicated disapproval by saying, "Assuming that such a contention, if of
substantial character, might have constituted ground for an appeal
... it

was not raised by the petition.... and it likewise is lacking in

substance." 5 (Italics ours.) And it is this dictum which has led
to much controversy and litigation due to the tendency of the state
courts to ignore the fact that the statement was merely dictum, and
not controlling in a case where the Constitutional question was directly presented. However, the fact that certiorari has not been
granted in any action of this nature since the decision in the Corrigan
case, may indicate that the state courts' interpretation of the dictum
was not contrary to the policy of the Supreme Court during this
period.
That judicial action of the courts constitutes state action is not
a new doctrine, and has been recognized by the courts for many
years." But cases so holding have generally dealt with circumstances
where the court's action was the essence of the wrongful conduct
and not an instance where the court was enforcing a valid private
agreement. This case therefore, extends the doctrine of judicial en-

I The case of McGhee v. Sipes, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. 2d 638, is decided in the same opinion. Since the facts in that case do not differ materially
from those in the Shelley case we have not related them.
2271 U. S. 323, 70 L. ed. 969 (1926).
3Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(nor were these restrictive covenants held to violate public policy).
4 Since the action was brought in the District of Columbia, the Fifth but
not the Fourteenth Amendment, could have been involved.
5 Corrigan v. Buckley, supra note 2 at 331, 70 L. ed. at 973.
6See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318, 25 L. ed. 667, 669 (1880);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 90, 91, 53 L. ed. 97, 102, 103 (1908).
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forcement as state action to situations where the courts are attempting to enforce valid private agreements, when such action will deny
to a citizen the protection of his rights to acquire, enjoy, own and
dispose of property. It should be noted that the decision in this
case in no way invalidates such restrictive covenants between individuals, merely denying to the parties the use of court facilities in
enforcing them.
M. O'D.
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Relator is a corporation organized under the Membership Corporation Law of New York State and is the legal and governing body of
a group who call themselves "Jehovah's Witnesses." Relator owns
and operates a large, well equipped and highly fruitful farm in Tompkins County, New York. Respondents, the local Board of Assessors,
held said farm to be not exempt from taxation under Section 4(6)
of the Tax Law,1 on the ground that the property was being used
for purposes other than those of a religious corporation. Relator
brought proceedings to have their action reviewed, claiming that the
property was being used primarily to feed its "ministers" gratuitously,
a purpose entitling it to tax exemption. The alleged "ministers" consist of some 250 individuals, all of whom are members of relator's
sect and all of whom live at a building maintained by relator in
Brooklyn, N. Y. The evidence does not indicate that they do any
work of a religious nature or that they are ordained in any accepted
sense of the word. In return for services ordinarily performed by
laymen, these "ministers" are paid $10.00 per month, plus "free"
food, housing and other necessities. Not only is the produce of the
farm used for feeding this group, but a large portion of it is sold to
the general public for profit. Relator has always known well in advance that such sales were to be made and has consistently derived
substantial profit therefrom. Relator claims that these are merely
incidental sales of surplus not affecting the exempt status that should
be granted because of the primary purpose of the property. Respondents made a motion for judgment. Held, motion granted and petition dismissed on the grounds that the so-called "ministers" are but
I "The following property shall be exempt from taxation: ...
"6. The real property of a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract . . . charitable . . . missionary . . . educational ...
purposes, . . . or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes. . . .The real property

of any such corporation not so used exclusively for carrying out thereupon
one or more of such purposes but leased or otherwise used for other purposes,
shall not be exempt .....

